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Abstract
We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expec-
tations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers
(“dictators”) in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncer-
tainty. We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population.
Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the popu-
lation. Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator
game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposers in
the ultimatum game, a result due to proposer’s subjective expectations about responders’ deci-
sions. The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and
lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.
1 Introduction
Individual decision making under uncertainty plays an important role in economic theory and
practice. Economic models of choice under uncertainty typically assume that agents have a prob-
ability distribution over the uncertain outcomes and combine this with their preferences in order
to choose the optimal alternative. Experiments of proposal and response such as the ultimatum
game have been used to understand the preference structures of the decision making agents. In
such games, the proposers’ payoffs not only depend on their own actions, but also on the uncertain
reactions of responders to the proposers’ choices, so that the proposers’ decisions will in general
depend on their expectations about the behavior of responders.
This paper shows, with the specific example of the ultimatum game, how the empirical con-
tent of experiments of proposal and response can be improved in several ways. First, as shown
by Manski (2002), many experimental studies have to rely on assumptions on agents’ expectations
about other players’ actions or other uncertainty (such as rational expectations) in order to identify
preferences, since observed choice data is generally not rich enough to uncover both expectations
(’beliefs’) and preferences. An exception is Nyarko and Schotter (2002), who collect data on actions
and beliefs in a laboratory setting for repeated two player games with simultaneous decision mak-
ing. They find that players are more likely to best-respond to their stated beliefs than to beliefs
∗We thank Vera Toepoel, Marcel Das and his team at CentERdata for support throughout the experiment. The first author
thanks the Canada Chair of Research in the Economics of Social Policies and Human Resources for support.
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inferred by the analyst from past decisions. Following Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Manski
(2004), we address the identification problem in Manski (2002) by collecting data on the proposers’
subjective probability distributions over the actions taken by responders, in addition to the usual
experimental data. Thus we ask the proposers direct questions on what they think are the proba-
bilities that their responder will make certain decisions.
Second, following the recent trend set by, for instance, Harrisson, Lau and Williams (2002),1
we use a large representative sample of the Dutch population rather than a convenience sample
of, for example, students, as used in much of the experimental literature. The individuals in the
sample were randomly assigned to a specific role, and are thus all drawn from the same population
distribution of preferences and beliefs. This makes the analysis useful for making inference on a
broad population.
Our non-homogeneous sample raises the issue of heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs. A
third important feature of our work is that we develop a rich econometric model incorporating
(”observed”) heterogeneity explained by background characteristics such as age and education
level as well as (”unobserved”) heterogeneity that cannot be captured by such characteristics.
A fourth distinctive feature of the model is that it is structural in the sense that it explicitly
disentangles preferences and beliefs about the reactions of responders. Unlike other investigations
which have incorporated subjective expectations data in an empirical choice model, our model also
allows for correlation between preferences and beliefs of proposers. Thus, for example, we allow
for the possibility that proposers with optimistic beliefs about the actions of responders also have
systematically different preferences, leading to a spurious correlation between beliefs and actions
and inducing an endogeneity bias in the estimates of the preference parameters. We avoid this bias
and are able to make causal inferences on the effect of beliefs on choices of proposers in the game.
Our application concerns preferences and beliefs for inequity aversion, an issue that has re-
ceived a lot of attention in the recent experimental literature. We use the model for linear asym-
metric inequity aversion introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), distinguishing inequity aversion
resulting from having a higher from that of having a lower payoff than the other player. This model
can explain the common finding in ultimatum game experiments that many proposers make equi-
table offers, in contrast with the traditional sub game equilibrium prediction that offers should not
exceed the smallest positive amount that can be offered. The latter ”traditional” prediction rests
on the two assumptions that proposers maximize their own expected monetary payoffs and expect
responders not to reject any positive offer (for example, because proposers think responders also
maximize their own monetary payoffs). Thus both preferences leading to deviations from expected
pay-off maximization, and the belief that not everyone accepts any positive offer could explain why
experimental results are out of line with the traditional prediction. Our framework and the data on
beliefs are particularly suited to disentangle these two explanations.
Our sample is randomly split up in four groups: proposers and responders in the ultimatum
game, and proposers (“dictators”) and passive responders (receivers) in the dictator game. The
proposers in the ultimatum game are not only asked how much they want to offer to the other
player, but are also asked about their subjective probabilities that responders will accept or reject
any possible offer. Actions of responders in the ultimatum game are elicited using the strategy
method, requiring responders to indicate their intended action for all possible offers that can be
1Other studies using representative samples are Bellemare and Kro¨ger (2004), and Fehr, Fischbacher, Von Rosenbladt,
Schupp, and Wagner (2002).
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made to them. Our model is estimated combining all this information.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find substantial deviations between the
average subjective acceptance probabilities reported by the proposers and the actual acceptance
rates in the responder data.
Second, we find that the model which incorporates proposers’ subjective probability distribu-
tions over all possible actions of responders provides a better fit to the observed choice distribution
than a model which assumes that proposers have rational expectations. This mirrors Nyarko and
Shotter (2002) finding that choice models using subjective probability distributions provide a better
fit to the actions in two by two normal form games.
Third, we find substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the subjective probabilities as well as in
preferences for inequity aversion, with a strong positive correlation between optimism and inequity
aversion.
Fourth, we find that aversion for inequity to own and other’s disadvantage declines as subject’s
level of education increases, and aversion for inequity towards other’s disadvantage increases with
age. Combining these effects, we find that of all the subgroups of the population our model can
distinguish on the basis of observable characteristics, subjects with high levels of education, below
30 years of age, and not participating in the labor market, have the most egoistic preferences in
the sense that their predicted behavior in the experiment comes the closest to what is predicted by
the traditional paradigm of maximizing own pay-off. This suggests that inequity aversion is much
larger in the Dutch population as a whole than extrapolations based on student samples would
suggest.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design. Sec-
tion 3 presents our approach to identify the economic parameters of interest. Section 4 presents
some descriptive statistics of our sample, and summary statistics of the choice decisions in the
experiment. Section 5 discusses the estimation results of the structural model, and presents simula-
tions to assess the fit and the implications of the model for observed behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experiment
Our subjects were recruited by CentERdata, the survey research institute affiliated to Tilburg Uni-
versity in the Netherlands. The main activity of CentERdata is to manage and carry out panel sur-
veys through an Internet panel: the CentERpanel (hereafter CP), consisting of approximately 2000
Dutch households. Every Friday, CP’s household members receive a questionnaire which they are
asked to fill in at any time between that Friday and the Tuesday of the following week. This is
done at home, either on their computer or using a television set connected to a set–up box linking
the household to the CentERdata server. In order to keep the sample representative of the Dutch
population, households without a computer or a television set are given the necessary equipment.2
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive medium to conduct experiments. First, it
gives access to a representative sample of a population, which is one of the key features of our
study. Second, because participants answer questions on a computer, we are able to replicate the
environment of a laboratory experiment, which simplifies comparisons of our results with those of
2For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see: www.centerdata.nl.
Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from the panel, the latter group for the reason that low
language proficiency in Dutch makes it difficult to answer the questions on a weekly basis.
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the existing literature. Third, the experiment is double blind as participants were told that they will
be anonymously matched and that their identities are not revealed to the experimenters. Finally,
as CentERdata reimburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire by crediting
CentERpoints (100 CentERpoint = 1 Euro) to the respondents’ bank accounts four times a year,
our participants are already familiar with payment in fictitious currency. This allows us to use
CentERpoints as the experimental currency unit and reimburse our participants in a convenient
way.
We randomly assigned the participants of the CentERpanel to the “ultimatum game” or the
“dictator game.” In both games, two persons, a proposer and a responder,3 can share an amount
of 1000 CentERpoints (10 Euros).4 In the ultimatum game the proposer suggests an allocation to
the responder. We discretized the choice set of the proposer to eight possible allocations: A ∈
{(1000, 0), (850, 150), (700, 300), (550, 450), (450, 550), ... , (0, 1000)} where the first and second
amount denote the payoffs for the proposer and the responder, respectively. Responders made
their choices using the strategy method, asking them for each of the eight allocations that could
be offered whether they would accept or reject. The response which corresponded to the actual
decision of the proposer matched to this responder determined the payoff of both participants.
After all participants had made their decisions, proposers and responders were randomly matched
and payoffs were computed based on the decisions of the pair. The final payoffs were computed
as follows: if the proposer had offered the allocation (X, Y) and the responder had stated he or she
would accept this allocation, responder and proposer received the amount according to this allo-
cation, i.e., the responder received X and the proposer received Y CentERpoints. If the offer was
rejected, the proposer and the responder both received nothing.
In the dictator game the responder had no active role. Both players received the payoffs deter-
mined by the proposer (which is why this game is referred to as “dictator game”).
The strategy method was chosen to overcome the difficulty of having CP members interact
in real time. This method has the additional advantage of providing more information, as the
responses to all eight possible allocations are elicited, including allocations that are never or hardly
ever chosen by the actual proposers.5
The beliefs of proposers in the ultimatum game were elicited with a series of subjective probabil-
ity questions. Eliciting subjective probabilities is cognitively demanding. To simplify the respon-
dents’ task, probabilities were obtained by asking subjects how many out of 100 persons would
accept/reject each offer, or how many out of 100 persons would offer a given allocation.6 In order
to be able to account for framing effects resulting from the phrasing of the question, approximately
half of the participants were asked to state their subjective acceptance probabilities for each pos-
sible offer, while the other half were asked to state their rejection probabilities. Also, in order to
circumvent the possibility that belief elicitation influences behavior, these questions were asked
3For ease of reading we keep the terms “proposer” and “responder” for the different roles. In the experiment we avoided
suggestive labels and referred to the persons themselves and the “matched panel member.” Computer screens of the original
experiment (in Dutch) and a translated version are available upon request.
4Carpenter, Burks, and Verhoogen (2005) find that in laboratory ultimatum and dictator games, there are no significant
differences in the actions of the players when the stakes are raised from 10 U.S. dollars (approximately 8.5 Euros) to 100 U.S.
dollars.
5McLeish and Oxoby (2004) find that decisions in the ultimatum game collected with the strategy method are not statis-
tically different from decisions collected in a hot environment.
6This follows Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (2000) who find that people are better at working with natural
frequencies than with percent probabilities.
4
after players had made their decisions. Subjects were not rewarded based on the accuracy of their
expectations.7 This concluded the experimental part of the session.
The experiment was conducted in March 2004. Individuals contacted had to read an opening
screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experiment conducted by a team
of university researchers. A detailed description of the game and an explanation of the payoff
structure followed. Each person was informed that conditional on their participation, they would
be randomly assigned to one of the roles and would be randomly matched to another panel mem-
ber playing the opposite role. The role was revealed once a panel member had agreed to participate.
We contacted 1410 panel members of whom 130 declined to participate and 17 did not react. Of
the 1263 panel members who completed the experiment, 389 (268) were proposers and 355 (251)
were responders in the ultimatum (dictator) game.8 As announced before the experiment, each
participant received information on the outcome of the game and their final payoff two weeks after
the experiment, and this amount was later credited to their CentER bank account.
3 An Empirical Model of Preferences and Beliefs
In this section we will introduce an econometric model to explain the behavior of proposers and
responders in the ultimatum game and proposers in the dictator game, as well as the acceptance or
rejection probabilities reported by the proposers in the ultimatum game. The model is structural
in the sense that preferences and beliefs are explicitly separated. We allow for heterogeneity of
both preferences and beliefs across the population. Preferences and beliefs can vary with observed
characteristics such as age, education level, labor force status, and gender (a vector xi of observed
individual characteristics) and with unobserved characteristics.
Preferences with Inequity Aversion
We incorporate inequity aversion in preferences following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), allowing for
different disutilities of having more and having less than the opponent. In the case of no uncer-
tainty, the utility to player i from pay-offs ysel f to him- or herself and yother to the other player is
given by:
ui(ysel f , yother) = ysel f − αi max{yother − ysel f , 0} − βi max{ysel f − yother, 0} (1)
For respondents who only care about their own pay-off, αi and βi would be equal to 0. If respon-
dents are inequity averse, αi and βi will be positive. If βi is smaller than αi, then, keeping the own
pay-off constant, the per (“CentER”) point disutility of having less than the other player is larger
than the per point disutility of having more than the other player.
7There are theoretical grounds suggesting that beliefs elicited by paying subjects for the accuracy of their beliefs using the
quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1967) should be lead to more precise disclosure of individual expectations than not paying
or paying a flat fee, but the empirical evidence seems not to support this. Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000) find
that unpaid participants in their experiment had surprisingly accurate estimates of the average actions; both Friedman and
Massaro (1998) and Sonnemans and Offerman (2001) find insignificant differences between using the quadratic scoring rule
or paying subjects a flat fee.
8Note that the number of responders exceeds the number of proposers. In order to balance the unequal numbers of
players in both roles, 8 proposers were randomly assigned twice to a responder. As all other participants, those 8 proposers
received payments resulting from only one (the first) matching.
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To allow for heterogeneous preferences across the population, we will allow the parameters αi
and βi to vary across respondents i, using the following specification:
αi = ex
′
iα+u
α
i ; βi = ex
′
i β+u
β
i (2)
Here uαi and u
β
i reflect unobserved heterogeneity. We will assume that (u
α
i , u
β
i ) is independent of
error terms and background variables xi and follows a bivariate normal distribution with mean
zero and arbitrary covariance matrix. We expect a positive correlation between uαi and u
β
i since
people with a general aversion to inequity will have large values for both.
For proposers in the dictator game, equations (1) and (2) are sufficient to describe their optimal
choice, since they face no uncertainty. Moreover, in the dictator game the sum of the two pay-offs
is given and is always the same, and it can be normalized to 1 (1,000 CentER points or 10 Euro,
in our experiment), implying that yother equals 1 − ysel f . As discussed in the previous section,
each proposer was asked to choose from a set of eight amounts (j = 1, ... , 8), involving pay-offs
yprop(1), ... , yprop(8). Perfectly optimizing behavior in the dictator game would therefore imply that
proposer i chooses the option j that maximizes
vDij = yprop(j)− αi max{1− 2yprop(j), 0} − βi max{2yprop(j)− 1, 0} (3)
To allow for the fact that some proposers in the dictator game will make sub-optimal choices, we
add idiosyncratic error terms λDeij to the true utilities vDij , and assume that respondent i chooses the
option j that maximizes vDij + λ
Deij rather than vDij . We assume that the errors eij are independent of
each other and of other variables in the model (such as the unobserved heterogeneity terms and the
observed characteristics xi), and follow a Generalized Extreme Value type I (GEV(I)) distribution.
This gives rise to the familiar multinomial logit probabilities:
P(Proposer i chooses j|vDi1, ... , vDi8) =
ev
D
ij /λ
D
∑8k=1 e
vDik /λ
D (4)
The parameter λD indicates the importance of sub-optimal behavior of the proposers in the dictator
game. If they behave optimally, λD is zero. If their behavior were equivalent to random choice, with
no role for the utility values, then λD would be infinitely large.
Proposers in the ultimatum game are faced with uncertainty, since they do not know whether
their offer will be accepted or rejected. We will assume expected utility maximization, based upon
proposer i’s specific subjective probability Qi(j) that offer j will be accepted. Since the utility is
zero if the offer is rejected, the expected utility of offer j is given by vUij = Qi(j)v
D
ij . Allowing for
sub-optimal behavior in the same way as before, with noise-to-signal ratio parameter λU , this gives
the following choice probabilities for proposers in the ultimatum game:
P(Proposer i chooses j|vUi1, ... , vUi8) =
ev
U
ij /λ
U
∑8k=1 e
vUik /λ
U (5)
For responders in the ultimatum game, the uncertainty is resolved, making their choice problem
deterministic. We will assume that the distribution of preferences among responders is the same as
among proposers. This assumption is very plausible, since participants were randomly assigned
to the role of proposer or the role of responder. Under these assumptions, responder i who gets an
offer yresp(j) = 1− yprop(j) with (j = 1, ... , 8) has to trade off the utility of rejecting and the utility
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of accepting the offer. According to (3), these utility values are vRij = 0 and
vAij = yresp(j)− αi max{1− 2yresp(j), 0} − βi max{2yresp(j)− 1, 0}. (6)
A perfect pay-off maximizing responder would thus choose to accept the offer if and only if vAij >
vRij (= 0). To allow for suboptimal behavior, we again add GEV(I) errors that are independent of
everything else in the model, multiplied by a noise-to-signal ratio parameter λR, and assume the
responder maximizes over the contaminated values rather than the exact values, giving the binary
logit probability:
P(Responder i accepts offer j|vAij ) =
1
1+ e−v
A
ij /λ
R (7)
Beliefs
In the experiment we ask for each proposer’s beliefs, so one approach is to take the reported ac-
ceptance or rejection probabilities in the data and plug them into equation (5). Assuming that the
reported beliefs are exactly the probabilities that the proposers use in making their decisions and
assuming that error terms and unobserved heterogeneity components (uαi , u
β
i ) are independent of
these beliefs would then imply that the Qi(j) are observed exogenous variables, and the preference
distribution can be estimated without modelling the beliefs.
There are, however, two reasons why this approach is unlikely to be valid. First, there appears to
be a framing effect of asking either rejection or acceptance probabilities: the distribution of the raw
data on reported acceptance probabilities differs substantially from the distribution of acceptance
probabilities implied by the raw data on reported rejection probabilities (see next section), showing
that answers to these questions suffer from framing bias. This framing bias cannot have affected
the answers to the choice questions (since the questions on the beliefs that have the ”frames” in
their wordings come after the questions on the choices), so that the probabilities entering the utility
comparison must first be purged of the framing bias in the reported probabilities.
Second, the acceptance probabilities may partly be driven by unobserved heterogeneity that
is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity terms uαi and u
β
i in the preference parameters.
The people with high inequity aversion may, for example, tend to be more optimistic and have
higher subjective probabilities that their offers will be accepted. Early experiments in cognitive
psychology, surveyed in Rapoport and Wallsten (1972), already provided evidence that subjective
probabilities are not independent of utilities over outcomes. If this is indeed the case, it leads to
correlation between reported acceptance probabilities and the unobserved heterogeneity terms uαi
and uβi in the choice equations, implying that reported acceptance probabilities are not exogenous
in the choice model and that estimates of preferences assuming exogeneity of choice probabilities
will be biased.
Both issues can be dealt with by modelling preferences and acceptance and rejection probabili-
ties jointly. We will allow these probabilities to vary with the same individual characteristics xi that
relate to preferences. In the raw data, we saw substantial bunching of the reported probabilities
at 0 and 1. We will account for this by modelling censoring at zero and at one, as in a two-limit
tobit model. First, we model the true probabilities Qi(j) used in expected utility maximization, not
affected by framing or other reporting errors:
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Q∗i (j) = x
′
iδ + γj + u
P
i
Qi(j) = 0 if Q∗i (j) < 0
= Q∗i (j) if 0 < Q
∗
i (j) < 1
= 1 if Q∗i (j) > 1
The γ parameters capture choice specific effects of subjective belief formation. For example, we
expect them to increase with j as long as amounts remain below the equal split, since proposers will
probably realize that acceptance probabilities will rise if the amount offered to the other player in-
creases towards an equal split. Whether γj also increases with j beyond the equal split or not is less
clear; here acceptance probabilities (and thus also the beliefs about them) can increase or decrease
depending on the extent of inequity aversion. The unobserved heterogeneity term uPi reflects the
proposer’s optimism or pessimism. We will assume that the three unobserved heterogeneity terms
(uαi , u
β
i , u
P
i ) are jointly normal with mean zero and with arbitrary covariance matrix to be estimated,
independent of error terms and of the regressors xi.
Reported probabilities Pi(j) can deviate from the true probabilities because of framing bias or
because of an idiosyncratic reporting error ePij . The latter is assumed to be i.i.d. normal and inde-
pendent of everything else. The framing bias at offer j is modelled in a symmetric way, using a
parameter φj. Define a ”framing” variable Fi which is equal to 1 if the belief questions to proposer i
are framed in terms of accepting and equal to -1 if they are framed in terms of rejection. The model
for the ”reported”9 acceptance probabilities Pi(j) is as follows:
P∗i (j) = x
′
iδ + γj + φjFi + u
P
i + e
P
ij
Pi(j) = 0 if P∗i (j) < 0
= P∗i (j) if 0 < P
∗
i (j) < 1
= 1 if P∗i (j) > 1
The raw data (see next section) suggest that the framing parameters φj are negative, implying
that reported acceptance probabilities are too small if the questions ask for probabilities of accept-
ing, and reported probabilities of rejecting are too small if the questions ask for probabilities of
rejecting. Imposing symmetry on the framing effects is necessary to identify the framing parame-
ters and the parameters γj in the true probabilities from the reported beliefs alone (i.e., without
relying on the data on choices and assumptions on preferences).
4 Descriptive statistics: sample, choices, and reported beliefs
Table 1 gives the description of the explanatory variables we will use in the empirical analysis.
The demographic structure of our sample is characterized by a median age of 48. The youngest
and oldest participants were 18 and 89 years old. We group our participants in six age categories,
each comprising 10 years of age. With the border categories, i.e., participants younger than 25
years (“Age < 25”) and more than 64 years of age (“Age > 64”), comprising 3% and 15.5% of all
participants, respectively. Most of our participants are between 35 and 44 years (23% in “Age 35-
44”) or between 45 an 54 years (25% in “Age 45-54”) old. Education levels are also arranged in six
9The reported acceptance probability is defined as one minus the reported rejection probability if the questions are
framed in terms of rejection probabilities.
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categories. The variable “Educ1” is a dummy for the lowest level, i.e., primary education (5% of the
sample), and “Educ6” is a dummy for the highest level of education, i.e., university degree (11% of
the sample). For more than half of the participants, the highest degree is from a vocational training
school, at a low, intermediate, or high level. (26%, 20% and 24%, respectively). About 59% of our
subjects are active in the labor force (“Market work”), 12% are homemakers (“House work”), 16%
are retired and 13% do not work (“Other”), i.e., are unemployed or students.
Figure 1 presents the choice frequencies of proposers in both the ultimatum game and the dicta-
tor game. These distributions exhibit two well-known features (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003): First, pro-
posers send positive amounts, with the mode around the equal split, and with very few amounts
much above that. Second, the distribution of amounts offered to the other player in the ultimatum
game stochastically dominates that in the dictator game.
— Figure 1 about here —-
Table 2 presents the choices of responders in the ultimatum game. Each line of the table presents
a choice sequence obtained using the strategy method, and the final column presents the sequence
frequencies. Choice sequences are grouped into three categories. The biggest group (53.7% of all
cases) is comprised of threshold players who accept any proposal above a certain amount. Their
threshold level is informative of the degree of inequity aversion for cases where they receive less
than the other player. The second biggest group (43.3%) are plateau players, defined as individuals
who accept offers in a range which excludes both the minimum and maximum amounts that can
be offered. The width of the plateau is informative of the degree of inequity aversion to both
own and other’s disadvantage (i.e., of αi and βi), as individuals reject offers giving them either
extremely advantageous or disadvantageous positions relative to the proposer. Similar levels of
plateau behavior in the ultimatum game have been reported in the laboratory (see e.g., Hennig-
Schmidt, Li, and Yang, 2004).
— Table 2 about here —
Finally, the third group plays what we call chain-saw behavior, without any systematic pattern.
This group is small (3.0%) and will be left out of our empirical analysis.10
The presence of a sizeable population of plateau types has an immediate consequence for the
aggregate acceptance rates, presented at the bottom of Table 2. We find that the acceptance rates
increase to above 90% for proposals around the equal split, before progressively declining to just
above 55% when proposers offer the whole amount to the responder.
Figure 2 presents the densities of subjective acceptance probabilities of proposers in the ultima-
tum game for offers of 0 CP, 450 CP, and 1000 CP. We see that the mode of the density is concentrated
near zero in the case of offers of 0 CP, implying that most proposers believe that offers of 0 will not
be accepted by the responder. Still, there is also a non-negligible number of proposers expecting
that an offer of 0 will certainly be accepted.
— Figure 2 about here —
The density for offers of 450 CP is quite different - it is centered around 50%. In this case, there
is substantial variability in the reported beliefs, with subjective acceptance probabilities varying all
over the unit interval.
10We also estimated the model including these respondents and found results that were very similar to those we present.
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For offers of 1000 CP, we find almost the mirror image of the distribution for offers of 0 CP.
Almost half of the proposers think an offer of 1,000 CP will certainly be accepted, and about 25%
think the offer will certainly be rejected.
In Figure 2, proposers in the ultimatum game getting the beliefs questions with the accept frame
and the reject frame are merged. Figure 3 presents the means of the subjective acceptance probabil-
ities for each amount that could be offered, separately for those who got the accept and the reject
frames. There is a significant effect of the question frame, with the accept frame giving lower ac-
ceptance probabilities than the reject frame. This effect is smallest for amounts sent of 450 and 550
CentER points. Violation of the additivity axiom of probability, by which the reported likelihood of
an event and its complement sum to less than one, seems to be well recognized in the psychology
literature on probability judgment; see Lindley, Tversky, and Brown (1979) for a discussion of this
phenomenon and related findings.
— Figure 3 about here —
Interestingly, many proposers in the ultimatum game appear to anticipate the presence of plateau
types in the responders population. We see that the acceptance rates expected by proposers level
off and even decline with offers in excess of an equal split. This result is all the more remarkable
since proposers have not had a chance to learn the expected pattern of response, either by having
played the game in repetition or by having been responders themselves.
5 Econometric results
We estimated the model presented in section 3 by maximum simulated likelihood. Integration over
the joint distribution of (uαi , u
β
i , u
P
i ) was performed by simulation, using 100 draws for each obser-
vation based on Halton sequences (see Train, 2003). In order to evaluate the impact of incorporating
subjective probability distributions in the model, we estimated a second model assuming that pro-
posers in the ultimatum game had rational expectations about the responders’ acceptance rates. In
that model, beliefs of all proposers are the same, and set equal to observed aggregate acceptance
rates of responders, taken from the bottom row of Table 2. This model is estimated without the
equation for beliefs and thus also without correlation between beliefs and unobserved heterogene-
ity in preferences.11 A third model takes the reported “raw” subjective probabilities as exogenous
variables reflecting the true probabilities underlying the proposers’ decisions.
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters for the first two models, distinguishing the effects
of some background characteristics on the inequity aversion parameters αi and βi, and, in the first
model, on the subjective beliefs of proposers in the ultimatum game. Table 4 presents the preference
parameters for the third model. Overall, parameter estimates of the inequity aversion equations of
the three models are similar. This could be expected since the choice data for senders in the dictator
game and responders in the ultimatum game are used in exactly the same way, only the choices
of the proposers in the ultimatum game are interpreted differently. Signs in the three models cor-
respond in all but a few cases and so do significance levels. As we will show below, the model
which uses subjective expectations provides a better fit to the data than the rational expectations
11The fact that the acceptance probabilities are estimated was ignored, so that the standard errors in this model are prob-
ably slightly underestimated.
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model and than the model with reported probabilities taken as exogenous, better reproducing the
distribution of choices made by proposers in the ultimatum game.
— Table 3 about here —
— Table 2 about here —-
For now, because of the similarity in preference parameters, we will focus our discussion on
the determinants of inequity aversion using the model with subjective expectations. A Wald test
of the null hypothesis that parameters of the α equation are equal to those of the β equation gives
a test statistic of 62.21 (χ215, p-value = 0.000), indicating a significant difference between correlates
of aversion to own and others disadvantage. We find that gender does not affect either type of
inequity aversion. Individuals with lowest levels of education have a higher level of inequity aver-
sion, both when inequity is to their advantage (the joint test that all education coefficients are zero
gives p-value = 0.0054) or to their disadvantage (joint test with p-value = 0.0748). While age does
not have a significant effect on the disutility from own disadvantage, the disutility from other’s dis-
advantage significantly increases with age. Individuals working for pay have significantly higher
aversion than non-workers to inequity which is to their own disadvantage.
From (2), it is straightforward to break down the total variance in predicted log disutility from
inequity into systematic parts x′α and x′β explained by observed characteristics, and unobserved
parts uαi and u
β
i . We find that 9.9% of the total variation in log(α) and 17.6% of the total variation
in log(β) can be attributed to variation in the systematic part.
The last two columns of Table 3 present estimates of the beliefs equation. We see that observable
characteristics have statistically insignificant effects on beliefs. A Wald test of the null hypothesis
that none of the observable characteristics plays a role gives a value of 22.94 (χ214) with a p-value
= 0.0613, so that the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level. This result is consistent with
the fact that subjects with different observable characteristics had the same information set when
we elicited their beliefs. They were randomly matched to another member of the panel, so that
the proposer’s characteristics are independent of the responder’s characteristics. It is therefore
perfectly rational that the proposer’s own characteristics do not affect the beliefs on the responder’s
actions.
As expected from Figure 3, we find that corrections for framing effects are jointly significant. A
Wald test (χ2 = 169.2, p-value for 8 df = 0.000) strongly rejects the null that there are no framing
effects (i.e., φ1 = φ2 = ... = φ8 = 0).
Table 5 presents parameter estimates of the covariance structure of the parts of attitudes towards
inequity aversion and subjective acceptance probabilities that are not explained by observed char-
acteristics. We see that unobserved attitudes play a significant role, as reflected by the positive and
precisely estimated variances of uαi , u
β
i and u
P
i . The share of total unexplained variation in beliefs of
proposers in the ultimatum game explained by individual attitudes is 93.3%.12 As conjectured, uαi
and uβi are significantly positively correlated, indicating that individuals with a stronger negative
predisposition towards inequity to their disadvantage also tend to have a stronger negative pre-
disposition towards inequity to their advantage. Interestingly, we find that the correlations of uPi
with uαi and u
β
i are both significant and positive, implying that proposers in the ultimatum game
12Because uPi and e
P
ij are independent, the share of total unexplained variation in reported subjective probabilities at-
tributed to attitudes is V
(
uPi
)
/(V
(
uPi
)
+V(ePij)).
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who are optimistic about the acceptance rates of responders also tend to have significantly higher
levels of inequity aversion, on average. Finally, the three scale parameters λU , λD and λR, whose
magnitudes are directly related to the CP units used in the experiment, are found to be precisely es-
timated in both models. All scale parameter estimates are larger in the rational expectations model
than in the subjective beliefs model, indicating that incorporating subjective probabilities in the
model reduces the estimated level of noise in the decision making process. This particularly holds
for λU , the parameter determining the noise in the decisions of proposers in the ultimatum game.
The main difference between the two models is that these decisions depend on subjective beliefs
in the complete model, whereas they depend on (objective) aggregate acceptance rates of respon-
ders in the rational expectations model. Apparently, at least part of what is ascribed to beliefs in
the complete model is ascribed to noise in the model imposing rational and identical beliefs for
all subjects. Furthermore, the covariance structure and scale parameters in the model using “raw”
subjective probabilities as exogenous variables (bottom of Table 4) are similar to those of the model
with corrects for endogeneity and framing bias in the reported subjective probabilities. In partic-
ular, there is still an important reduction in λU relative to the model estimated assuming rational
expectations.
— Table 5 about here —
Distributions of α and β and model specification
The left hand columns of Table 6 presents quantiles of the predicted distributions of αi and βi
in the population based on parameter estimates of the complete model. The bottom of the table
reports the estimated correlation coefficient between αi and βi in the population. We find that
the correlation between aversion for inequality to own and aversion towards inequality to other’s
disadvantage is positive.
— Table 6 about here
The quantiles give three important insights. First, the estimated proportion of pure selfish types
is less than 10% of the population (α and β close to zero).13 Second, the cumulative distribution of β
rapidly dominates the cumulative distribution of α, indicating a relatively stronger disutility from
having more than others than from having less than others. Third, there is considerable hetero-
geneity in predicted preferences for inequity aversion, with both α and β taking values in excess of
4.
Several papers provide point estimates of α and β, most of them based on experimental data
collected in the lab with homogeneous samples (see, e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2000). To our knowl-
edge, there exist no estimates of distributions of α and β in either student or broader populations.
In their original study of inequity aversion, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proposed distributions of α
and β which were calibrated on experimental evidence based on observed offer and acceptance
behavior from ultimatum experiments, mostly relying exclusively on student participants. Their
calibrated multinomial distributions were as follows, with the first number denoting the value of
α or β, and the number in parentheses denoting the calibrated proportion for that value in the
13Our functional form assumptions on α and β rule out negative values. We also estimated a model where α and β are
linear functions of observable and unobservable characteristics. Results were very similar to those presented here.
12
population: α ∈ {0(0.3), 0.5(0.3), 1(0.3), 4(0.1)} and β ∈ {0(0.3), 0.25(0.3), 0.6(0.4)}.14 When com-
paring the medians of these distributions with the medians of α and β in Figure 6, we find that the
Dutch population tends to have inequity aversion parameters exceeding those of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). This is particularly the case for the distribution of β, where our estimated median is 1.227,
as opposed to 0.25 for the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) calibration. Moreover, more than 60% of our
population is predicted to have an aversion for inequity to other’s disadvantage with a β greater
than 1. In contrast, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) rule out the possibility that β is larger than 1 as im-
plausible, since values of β which are greater than 1 suggest that subjects who have more than their
opponent would, keeping the opponent’s pay off constant, be better off giving away the surplus.
Our responders data, characterized by an important share of plateau behavior, imply that, at least
for a substantial part of the Dutch population, this is not as implausible as it seemed, with many
people rejecting the offer and thus sacrificing their own pay-off to get more equity.
A natural question is whether the differences between our distributions of α and β and those
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can be explained by a specific cultural trait of the Dutch population,
or a composition effect, reflecting the greater heterogeneity of our participants compared to those
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Restricting ourselves to only individuals below 25 years of age, with
a university degree, who are not homemakers or working for pay, we get a median predicted α of
0.416 and a median predicted β of 0.256, well in line with the Fehr and Schmidt predictions. Hence,
if there is a cultural effect, it does not show up in the subgroup of the population which mirrors the
subjects typically used in lab experiments. These results suggest that the composition of a sample
can have an important impact on the estimated levels of inequity aversion.
In order to check our model specification in an informal way, we estimated the vectors of in-
equity aversion parameters using only the accept/reject decisions of responders in the ultimatum
game. This is based on equations (2), (6), and (7) only, and does not use the information on actions
and beliefs of dictators and proposers in the ultimatum game. Using the new preference parameter
estimates, we predicted again the population distributions of α and β.15 Quantiles of these distrib-
utions are presented along those of the complete model in the right hand columns of Table 6. We
find that both the quantiles and the correlation between the α and β distributions accord well with
those obtained when data on proposer decisions and beliefs are added to those of the responders.
Marginal effects
In order to quantify the relationship between the predicted heterogeneity in choice distributions
and observable characteristics, we used the parameter estimates of the model with subjective ex-
pectations to compute expected choice distributions in the dictator and ultimatum games for a
benchmark individual. Given the predominance of laboratory studies with subject pools recruited
from the student body population, our benchmark subject is a female below 25 years of age and
with a university degree (Educ6 = 1) who is currently neither working for pay, nor homemaker or
retired (labor force status “Other”). We then computed corresponding distributions by altering the
characteristics of the benchmark one at a time. Comparing the new predicted choice distributions
with those of the benchmark individual gives a series of marginal effects for all the observable
characteristics in the model.
14Similar distributions were found by Huck, Mu¨ller, and Norman (2001) in a sequential two player market experiment.
15Parameter estimates and significance levels were very close to those of the complete model and are available upon
request.
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Table 7 presents the results for the proposers in the dictator game (“dictators”). The mode of
the baseline choice distribution of the benchmark dictator is to offer 0 CP, with a probability of
36.3%. Offers of 150 CP, 300 CP, and 450 CP are made with probabilities of 19.6%, 14.1%, and 20.8%,
respectively. The probability of making offers above 450 CP is less than 10%. The other rows in the
table present the deviations from the baseline probability resulting from altering one characteristic.
— Table 7 about here —
The strongest and most significant effects relate to changes in age and education level. We find
that dictators with the lowest education level have a significantly higher probability of making
offers in the equal split range, with the probability of making offers of 450 CP and 550 CP 15.3
and 13.6 percentage points higher than for the highest level of education, respectively. Most of
this increase in probability is taken from offers of 0 CP, whose probability falls by 21.3 percentage
points. The magnitude of the effects tends to dampen as the level of education increases and comes
closer to the benchmark level (high education). These education effects are consistent with the
parameter estimates, showing that inequity aversion to other’s disadvantage is stronger for low
education than for high education individuals (see Table 3).
Similar differences are found across age groups.16 Individuals between 44 and 54 years of age
have a 12.2 percentage points higher probability of offering 550 CP, and a 17.5 percentage points
lower probability of offering 0 CP than the younger benchmark person. The age effect is stronger as
age differs more from the benchmark level. Individuals above 64 years of age have 21.1 percentage
points higher probability of offering 550 CP, and 25.6 percentage points lower probability of offering
0 CP. Again, these results reflect our finding that older subjects are more averse to inequity to
other’s disadvantage.
When computing marginal effects in the ultimatum game, account must be taken of the fact
that variations in observable characteristics can affect the choice distribution through variations
in preferences and variations in subjective beliefs. In order to make a direct comparison possible
with the marginal effects in the dictator game (where all acceptance probabilities are equal to one),
we present the marginal effects of shifts in preferences only, keeping the subjective beliefs fixed to
those of the benchmark individual. The marginal effects reflecting differences in both subjective
beliefs and preferences were found to be very similar, in accordance with the insignificant impact
of observable characteristics on subjective beliefs reported in Table 3.17
Table 8 presents the results. To understand the difference with the dictator game, the first line
reports the predicted subjective acceptance probabilities Qi(j) for the benchmark individual for
all offers j. The benchmark individual’s subjective probability that an offers of 0 CP will be ac-
cepted is 12.2%. This probability increase up to 58.0% for offers of 550 CP, and then decreases for
higher offers. The low subjective acceptance probabilities for the low offers makes these alterna-
tives unattractive, even to an expected payoff maximizer. Hence, despite having preferences which
are relatively egoistic compared to those of other subgroups of the population, the benchmark pro-
poser now has a predicted choice distribution exhibiting a high level of equity, with offers of 450
CP occurring with a probability of 49.1%. On the other hand, the benchmark probability of making
offers of 0 CP falls from 36.3% in the dictator game to 2.1% in the ultimatum game.
— Table 8 about here —
16Age effects can be cohort effects as well as genuine age effects; the two cannot be distinguished here.
17Details are available upon request from the authors.
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Overall, the marginal effects resemble those observed in the dictator game: older and less edu-
cated individuals more often make payoff equalizing offers of either 450 or 550 CP. However, the
magnitudes of the marginal effects are smaller in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game,
and characterized by different patterns of substitution. While the probability mass going to 450
and 550 CP is mostly taken from offers of 0 CP in the dictator game, it is taken from offers of 300 CP
in the ultimatum game, as the benchmark probability of making offers of 0 CP is practically zero.
Table 9 presents the estimated marginal effects for responders in the ultimatum game, for each
of the eight decisions of responders. Our benchmark has probabilities of above 80 percent of ac-
cepting offers of 450 CP and above, showing that for the benchmark responders, threshold behavior
is more prevalent than plateau behavior. In line with higher aversion to inequity to other’s disad-
vantage, individuals with low levels of education, and those of 45 years and older have a lower
probability than the benchmark of accepting offers that put them in a more advantageous position.
For example, low educated individuals have a 29.5%-points lower probability of accepting all of the
1000 CP, and those older than 64 years of age have a 39.6%-points lower probability of accepting
that same offer. These differences generate plateau behavior of the low educated and the elderly.
— Table 9 about here —
Simulations
In this section, we perform simulations to assess the goodness of fit of each model, enabling us
to compare the predictive power of the model which uses data on subjective probabilities with
the model estimated under the assumption that proposers in the ultimatum game have rational
expectations. Figure 4 presents the observed (dark bars) and predicted (light bars) choice distrib-
utions for the three groups of players in our experiment. The left column presents the observed
and predicted distributions based on the model using subjective probabilities of proposers in the
ultimatum game while the right column presents the corresponding predictions for the model with
rational expectations. All predicted distributions were computed by averaging predicted choice
probabilities over all players in the relevant roles.
— Figure 4 about here —
We find that the model which incorporates the subjective data successfully predicts the impor-
tant probability mass of proposals around the equal split, with some over-prediction in the ulti-
matum game of proposals in the range between 0 and 300 CP. The fit is particularly good for the
acceptance rates of responders, where the model captures the decline in acceptance rates for pro-
posals over 550 CP. The rational expectations model provides a worse fit of the choice distribution
of proposers in the ultimatum game. In particular, it predicts a more dispersed choice distribution,
with more mass on low and high offers. As a result, it overpredicts the number of offers between 0
and 300 CP, underpredicts offers of 450 CP, underpredicts more offers of 550 CP, and clearly over-
predicts offers in excess of 550 CP. Both models provide a similar fit to the choice distributions of
proposers in the dictator game and to the acceptance probabilities of responders in the ultimatum
game.
Figure 5 presents two predicted offer distributions computed using the estimates of the pref-
erence parameters of the model with subjective expectations data. The dark bars present the pre-
dicted offer distribution of this model. The light bars represent the predicted distribution after
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replacing the subjective acceptance rates of all proposers by ”rational expectations,” i.e., by the
observed acceptance frequencies of responders in the data, taken from the bottom of Table 2. The
predicted offer distribution under rational expectations is more concentrated around 450 CP and
550 CP, reflecting the fact that observed acceptance rates of offers of 450 CP and 550 CP are above
90%, while observed acceptance rates of offers below and above those amounts are substantially
lower than the average subjective acceptance probabilities. The differences between the two distri-
butions are substantial, emphasizing that deviations between subjective probabilities and rational
expectations based probabilities have important consequences for decision making.
— Figure 5 about here —
Finally, we present the simulated choice distributions according to the complete model with
subjective expectations for four subgroups of the population: men below 25 years of age with a
university degree and not working (“students”, group 1), men below 25 years of age with a primary
degree and not working (group 2), men above 64 years of age with a university degree and not
working (group 3), and men above 64 years of age with a primary degree and not working (group
4). Results for proposers in the ultimatum game, proposers in the dictator game, and responders
in the ultimatum game are presented in Figures 6, 7, and 8, respectively. In all figures, passing
from the left to the right reduces education, while passing from the top to the bottom increases
age. For proposers in the ultimatum and dictator games, we see that the predicted distribution in
the subgroup which proxies the student population is concentrated towards offers between 0 CP
and 450 CP. In both games, individuals who are either older or less educated have a much greater
tendency of making offers of 450 CP or 550 CP, and a lower tendency of making offers below 450 CP.
The difference increases when education as well as age are different from that of the student group
(lower right hand side graph), with the likelihood of offers between 0 CP and 300 CP practically
vanishing. The shifts in the dictator game are larger than in the ultimatum game, in line with the
differences between the marginal effects in Tables 8 and 7.
In Figure 8 with the acceptance probabilities of responders in the ultimatum game, all four sub-
groups have low probabilities of accepting offers of 0 CP and 150 CP, and probabilities of accepting
offers of 450 CP and 550 CP which exceed 80%. Consistent with increasing aversion from inequity
to the other player’s disadvantage, the four graphs differ in terms of the acceptance probabilities of
offers above 550 CP. While these remain above 80% in the student subgroup, they are much smaller
for the less educated (group 2) and the older subgroups (group 3), with the probability of accepting
all of the proposers endowment (1000 CP) falling close to 40%. Again, the decrease in the accep-
tance probabilities of high offers is stronger when combining the increase of age with the decrease
of the education level, leading to group 4’s quite high aversion for other’s disadvantage and low
acceptance rates for high offers.
— Figures 6, 7, and 8 about here —
6 Conclusion
The ultimatum game and the dictator game are well-known tools in experimental economics for
eliciting preferences for inequity aversion. The current paper improves on the empirical content
of existing studies in several ways. First, a large representative sample of the (Dutch) population
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is used rather than the convenience sample of students used in most other studies. The size of
the sample and its heterogeneity in terms of education level, age, gender, and other characteristics
allow for an analysis of preference heterogeneity. Second, we randomly assign respondents to
either the ultimatum or the dictator game, and to the role of proposer or responder, and use the
random nature of this assignment to better identify the distribution of preferences (or ”types”) in
the population. Third, we use direct questions on respondents’ subjective probabilities that offers
will be accepted or rejected to model respondents’ beliefs and to test the assumption of rational
expectations.
These features of the data are combined to formulate a structural micro-econometric model of
preferences and beliefs, allowing for heterogeneity through observed and unobserved variables,
and allowing for an arbitrary correlation structure of the unobserved heterogeneity components.
The model is estimated combining all the available data and the findings are compared with a
model that imposes that, for all amounts that can be proposed, each agent’s beliefs are equal to the
observed aggregate acceptance rates of responders (“rational expectations”).
The main findings are as follows. First, the model is found to fit well the observed choices in our
experiment. The model which uses subjective expectations fits the data better than a model which
maintains that proposers in the ultimatum game have rational expectations, suggesting that col-
lecting subjective expectations data may prove to be helpful in predicting behavior in many more
experiments of proposal and response similar to the ones presented in this paper. The beliefs of
proposers nevertheless showed a surprising amount of foresight in our heterogeneous population
as they correctly forecasted the decline in acceptance rates for offers in excess of an equal split of
the surplus. While the expected magnitude of the acceptance rates of these proposers differed sub-
stantially from the observed rates, they nevertheless correctly anticipated the presence of equity
aversion in the responder population.
Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences as well as beliefs. Inequity aversion
rises with age and falls with education level, something that generates important variation in the
choice distribution of dictators and responders in the ultimatum game. In particular, young, highly
educated, and unemployed subjects make up the subgroup of the population whose decisions in
the dictator games and responders in the ultimatum game are the most egoistic. Hence, extending
the subject pool from students only to a more representative population not only increases the dis-
persion in predicted levels of inequity aversion, but also generates a distribution with much greater
levels of inequity aversion. Indeed, the predicted distribution of aversion to own and other’s dis-
advantage in our population is more dispersed than that which is usually derived from laboratory
experiments (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Huck, Mu¨ller, and Normann, 2001). All this suggests
that the choice of the subject pool may play an important role when making inferences about the
distribution of preferences in the population.
Third, we found that variations in preferences have a much greater impact on the choice distri-
bution in the dictator game than on the choice distribution in the ultimatum game. This is because
in the latter, acceptance probabilities of low and high offers are much lower than acceptance prob-
abilities of payoff equalizing offers, making the latter choices more attractive for a broader range of
preferences.
Fourth, unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role for preferences as well as beliefs. The
correlations between the heterogeneity terms indicate that the people who are more averse towards
inequity at the cost of themselves are typically also more averse to inequity at the cost of the other
17
player, and also tend to be relatively optimistic about the chances that responders will accept a
given proposal.
The fact that there is substantial (unobserved) heterogeneity of beliefs across the population al-
ready provides evidence that not everyone can have rational expectations, since every proposer is
matched to a completely anonymous and random responder. Moreover, we find that even the
median proposer does not have rational expectations, and underestimates the probability that
amounts sent exceeding the equal split will be accepted by the responder. The deviations from
rational expectations lead to a substantial dispersion in the proposed amounts.
Future research can address various limitations. One is extending the number of “types” of
players with different preferences. We already allow for a continuum of types with two inequity
aversion parameters varying from zero to infinity, but extensions could, for example, allow for
maxmin preferences (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002), which will typically require additional exper-
imental data. Another important extension is to consider the effect of intentions (see e.g., Blount,
1995) which could be analyzed by comparing the current data with similar data where the proposer
is replaced by a computer generating the amount offered, taking away the argument that different
offers are informative of the intentions of proposers.
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0 150 300 450 550 700 850 1000 N
Threshold behavior
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 30
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 89
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Plateau behavior
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 20
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 22
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 61
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 8
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 4
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Chainsaw behavior
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Aggregate acceptance rates
0.05 0.15 0.32 0.93 0.91 0.68 0.58 0.55
Notes: Sample of 355 responders in the ultimatum game.
Columns: amounts that can be offered (strategy method).
1: accept offer; 0: reject offer; N: number of observations.
Table 2: Observed choice sequences for responders
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α β
Coef. t.value Coef. t.value
Constant 0.233 0.391 0.188 0.506
Male -0.167 -1.141 -0.143 -1.412
Educ2 -0.777 -1.791 -0.665 -2.582
Educ3 -0.785 -1.772 -0.812 -3.071
Educ4 -0.696 -1.528 -0.986 -3.635
Educ5 -0.704 -1.568 -0.772 -2.921
Educ6 -0.885 -1.984 -1.331 -4.734
Age 25-34 -0.099 -0.198 0.352 1.041
Age 35-44 0.310 0.628 0.824 2.486
Age 45-54 0.116 0.234 1.112 3.346
Age 55-64 0.154 0.310 1.168 3.478
Age g.t. 64 0.277 0.501 1.133 3.692
Market work 0.466 2.054 0.037 0.268
House work 0.234 0.856 -0.195 -1.077
Retired 0.556 1.629 0.507 2.505
Covariance matrix and scale parameters
Coef. t.value
V
(
uαi
)
0.842 6.587
V
(
uβi
)
1.259 7.689
Corr
(
uαi , u
β
i
)
0.282 4.011
λU 55.983 15.128
λD 154.934 8.849
λR 70.527 12.936
Table 4: Parameter estimates of model using raw subjective expectations data. T-values based on
robust standard errors.
Rational expectations model Subjective expectations model
Coef. t.value Coef. t.value
V
(
uαi
)
1.017 6.356 0.803 6.137
V
(
uβi
)
1.144 8.171 1.331 7.273
V
(
uPi
)
- - 0.851 8.343
Corr
(
uαi , u
β
i
)
0.255 3.899 0.251 3.777
Corr
(
uαi , u
P
i
)
- - 0.835 7.813
Corr
(
uβi , u
P
i
)
- - 0.625 3.173
λU 115.64 11.325 45.513 12.254
λD 161.09 9.998 155.555 8.620
λR 72.04 10.857 68.167 11.976
V
(
ePij
)
- - 0.061 37.043
Table 5: Estimates of the covariance matrix and scale parameters. T-values based on robust stan-
dard errors.
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Prop. and Resp. Resp only
Percentile α β α β
10th 0.187 0.329 0.207 0.346
20th 0.322 0.514 0.346 0.468
30th 0.472 0.713 0.506 0.603
40th 0.657 0.943 0.696 0.963
50th 0.898 1.227 0.928 1.231
60th 1.225 1.589 1.246 1.732
70th 1.696 2.088 1.717 1.969
80th 2.482 2.897 2.475 2.975
90th 4.268 4.499 4.185 4.784
Correlation 0.267 0.241
Table 6: Sample percentiles of the estimated distributions of α and β based on parameter estimates
from the complete model combining both proposers and responders data (columns 2 and 3) and a
model using only responders (columns 4 and 5).
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0 CP 150 CP 300 CP 450 CP 550 CP 700 CP 850 CP 1000 CP
Baseline prob. 0.363 0.196 0.141 0.208 0.078 0.011 0.003 0.001
Male -0.032** -0.007 0.004 0.023** 0.011** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ1 -0.213** -0.080*** -0.012 0.153*** 0.136*** 0.013*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.092) (0.027) (0.042) (0.054) (0.019) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ2 -0.107*** -0.033* 0.000 0.057* 0.069*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.041) (0.019) (0.023) (0.034) (0.018) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Educ3 -0.084*** -0.027 -0.000 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ4 -0.044*** -0.013 0.002 0.030** 0.022*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ5 -0.083*** -0.028 -0.002 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.006** 0.001** 0.000**
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Age 25-34 -0.009 0.010 0.009 -0.032 0.014 0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.067) (0.023) (0.015) (0.082) (0.016) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Age 35-44 -0.123 -0.033 0.007 0.061 0.073*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.075) (0.020) (0.026) (0.067) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Age 45-54 -0.175* -0.058** -0.003 0.090 0.122*** 0.019*** 0.004*** 0.001***
(0.090) (0.025) (0.034) (0.067) (0.018) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Age 55-64 -0.195** -0.069*** -0.008 0.104 0.141*** 0.020*** 0.005*** 0.001***
(0.092) (0.025) (0.037) (0.064) (0.016) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Age g.t. 64 -0.256** -0.107*** -0.033 0.151*** 0.212*** 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.001***
(0.109) (0.030) (0.048) (0.047) (0.035) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000)
Market work -0.023 0.003 0.011 0.014 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.037) (0.011) (0.007) (0.034) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
House work 0.034** 0.014 0.003 -0.025 -0.021 -0.003* -0.001* -0.000*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.013) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.061 -0.010 0.011 0.033 0.025** 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.047) (0.013) (0.015) (0.049) (0.012) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
’*’: significant at 10 percent level.
’**’: significant at 5 percent level.
’***’: significant at 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Marginal effects for dictators based on model with subjective expectations. Baseline choice
probability levels represent probabilities for a female, with the highest level of education (Educ6),
younger than 25 years, labor force status “Other”. Effects are computed as differences in the choice
probabilities compared to the baseline probability. Standard errors in parentheses.
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0 CP 150 CP 300 CP 450 CP 550 CP 700 CP 850 CP 1000 CP
Baseline Q(j) 0.122 0.279 0.380 0.514 0.580 0.456 0.421 0.311
Baseline prob. 0.021 0.084 0.157 0.491 0.218 0.014 0.007 0.008
Male 0.000 -0.009 -0.010** 0.016 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.014) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ1 0.007 -0.049 -0.078** 0.011 0.109*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.037) (0.032) (0.071) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Educ2 0.000 -0.029 -0.042*** -0.011 0.078*** 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.019) (0.013) (0.050) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ3 0.002 -0.022* -0.032*** -0.000 0.051*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.033) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ4 0.001 -0.012* -0.016*** 0.007 0.020*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.017) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ5 0.003 -0.021* -0.031*** 0.002 0.046*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.024) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 25-34 -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.026 0.049 0.004 0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.064) (0.040) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 35-44 -0.003 -0.034 -0.047* 0.000 0.082*** 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.028) (0.026) (0.069) (0.022) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 45-54 -0.001 -0.045 -0.068** -0.027 0.136*** 0.003* 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.034) (0.033) (0.074) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 55-64 0.001 -0.048 -0.075** -0.033 0.151*** 0.003** 0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.035) (0.033) (0.075) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Age g.t. 64 0.011 -0.057 -0.099** -0.061 0.201*** 0.003** 0.000*** 0.001
(0.022) (0.042) (0.041) (0.070) (0.046) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Market work -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.039* -0.023 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.018) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
House work -0.002 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.012 -0.033** -0.002* -0.000** -0.000
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Retired -0.002 -0.018 -0.019 0.030 0.011 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.050) (0.030) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
’*’: significant at 10 percent level.
’**’: significant at 5 percent level.
’***’: significant at 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8: Marginal effects for proposers in the ultimatum game keeping beliefs at the baseline level.
Baseline choice probability levels represent probabilities for a female, with the highest level of
education (Educ6), younger than 25 years, labor force status “Other”. Effects are computed as
differences in the choice probabilities compared to the baseline probability. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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0 CP 150 CP 300 CP 450 CP 550 CP 700 CP 850 CP 1000 CP
Baseline prob. 0.088 0.333 0.600 0.880 0.985 0.915 0.867 0.835
Male -0.022 -0.050 -0.041 -0.009 -0.002 -0.015 -0.022 -0.027
(0.023) (0.037) (0.028) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Educ1 -0.055 -0.145 -0.134 -0.031 -0.045 -0.190** -0.258*** -0.295***
(0.060) (0.119) (0.087) (0.040) (0.048) (0.085) (0.093) (0.096)
Educ2 -0.014 -0.020 0.006 0.023 -0.012 -0.066 -0.094* -0.113**
(0.026) (0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.017) (0.043) (0.050) (0.055)
Educ3 -0.012 -0.022 -0.011 0.004 -0.013 -0.058 -0.080 -0.094*
(0.015) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.047) (0.050) (0.054)
Educ4 -0.013 -0.026 -0.019 -0.002 -0.006 -0.028 -0.039 -0.047
(0.015) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
Educ5 -0.006 -0.015* -0.016* -0.008 -0.016 -0.065 -0.086 -0.100
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061)
Age 25-34 -0.003 0.030 0.100 0.078 0.012 0.041 0.048 0.049
(0.053) (0.110) (0.126) (0.120) (0.031) (0.073) (0.098) (0.109)
Age 35-44 -0.034 -0.066 -0.015 0.038 -0.002 -0.050 -0.083 -0.105*
(0.057) (0.113) (0.095) (0.084) (0.012) (0.049) (0.057) (0.061)
Age 45-54 -0.024 -0.037 0.007 0.037 -0.016 -0.109* -0.161** -0.195**
(0.044) (0.081) (0.072) (0.073) (0.021) (0.057) (0.066) (0.076)
Age 55-64 -0.026 -0.045 -0.007 0.029 -0.027 -0.143** -0.204*** -0.240***
(0.042) (0.076) (0.064) (0.062) (0.030) (0.062) (0.074) (0.083)
Age g.t. 64 -0.028 -0.065 -0.056 -0.014 -0.078 -0.278** -0.357*** -0.396***
(0.030) (0.048) (0.036) (0.022) (0.073) (0.115) (0.112) (0.108)
Market work -0.051 -0.129 -0.111 -0.020 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.003
(0.057) (0.110) (0.080) (0.038) (0.015) (0.034) (0.046) (0.048)
House work -0.027 -0.062 -0.051 -0.010 0.008 0.030 0.039 0.043
(0.029) (0.048) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.040) (0.045) (0.043)
Retired -0.052 -0.128 -0.092 0.008 0.002 -0.013 -0.026 -0.036
(0.067) (0.141) (0.110) (0.070) (0.009) (0.030) (0.044) (0.047)
’*’: significant at 10 percent level.
’**’: significant at 5 percent level.
’***’: significant at 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Marginal effects for responders in the ultimatum game based on model with subjective
expectations. Baseline probabilities of acceptance represent probabilities for a female, with the
highest level of education (Educ6), younger than 25 years, labor force status ”other”. Effects are
computed as differences in the choice probabilities compared to the baseline probability. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Proposers in the ultimatum and dictator games
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Figure 1: Distribution of amounts sent in the dictator and ultimatum games
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Figure 2: Distribution of proposers’ subjective acceptance probabilities28
Average subjective acceptance probabilities
Accept and reject framing of survey question
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Figure 3: Beliefs of proposers in the ultimatum game for different framings of the questions
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Proposers in the ultimatum game
Model with subjective expectations
Amount offered (CentERpoints)
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Proposers in the ultimatum game
Model with rational expectations
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Proposers in the dictator game
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Responders in the ultimatum game
Model with subjective expectations
Amount received (CentERpoints)
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Responders in the ultimatum game
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Figure 4: Left column presents observed and predicted choice distributions in the experiment using
the model with subjective expectations. The right column presents observed and predicted choice
distributions using the model with rational expectations.
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Predicted offers in the ultimatum game
complete model with subjective / rational expectations
Amount offered (CentERpoints)
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Figure 5: Predicted offer distribution in the ultimatum game using the model with subjective ex-
pectations (dark bars), predicted offer distribution setting subjective acceptance probabilities of all
proposers to their sample average (white bars), and predicted offer distribution setting the subjec-
tive acceptance probabilities of all proposers to the observed acceptance rates of responders (grey
bars).
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< 25 years, university degree
Amount offered (CentERpoints)
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> 64 years, university degree
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Figure 6: Predicted distributions of amounts sent by proposers in the ultimatum game for four
groups: men below 25 years of age with a university degree and not working (top left), men, below
25 years of age with a primary degree and not working (top right), men above 64 years of age with
a university degree and not working (bottom left), and men above 64 years of age with a primary
degree and not working (bottom right).
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Figure 7: Predicted distributions of amounts sent by proposers in the dictator game for four groups:
men below 25 years of age with a university degree and not working (top left), men, below 25
years of age with a primary degree and not working (top right), men above 64 years of age with
a university degree and not working (bottom left), and men above 64 years of age with a primary
degree and not working (bottom right).
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Figure 8: Predicted proportions of offers accepted by responders in the ultimatum game for four
groups: men below 25 years of age with a university degree and not working (top left), men, below
25 years of age with a primary degree and not working (top right), men above 64 years of age with
a university degree and not working (bottom left), and men above 64 years of age with a primary
degree and not working (bottom right).
34
References
BELLEMARE, C., AND S. KRO¨GER (2004): “On Representative Social Capital,” IZA Discussion Paper
1145.
BLOUNT, S. (1995): “When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Pref-
erences,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 63, 131.
CAMERER, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton.
CARPENTER, J., S. BURKS, AND E. VERHOOGEN (2005): “Examining the Effect of Stakes in Distrib-
ution Experiments,” Forthcoming, Economics Letters.
CHARNESS, G., AND M. RABIN (2002): “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,”
Quarterly journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.
FEHR, E., U. FISCHBACHER, B. V. ROSENBLADT, J. SCHUPP, AND G. WAGNER (2002): “A Nation-
Wide Laboratory,” Schmollers Jahrbuch, 122, 519–542.
FEHR, E., AND K. SCHMIDT (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,” Quar-
terly journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.
FRIEDMAN, D., AND D. W. MASSARO (1998): “Understanding variability in binary and continuous
choice,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 5, 370–389.
GOEREE, J. K., AND C. A. HOLT (2000): “Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in
alternating-offer bargaining games,” European Economic Review, 44, 1079–1089.
HARRISON, G. W., M. I. LAU, AND M. B. WILIAMS (2002): “Estimating Individual Discount Rates
in Denmark: A Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 92(5), 1606–1617.
HENNIG-SCHMIDT, H., Z.-Y. LI, AND C. YANG (2004): “Why People Reject Advantageous Offers:
Non-monotone Strategies in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Bonn Econ Discussion paper, 22.
HOFFRAGE, U., S. LINDSEY, R. HERTWIG, AND G. GIGERENZER (2000): “Communicating Statistical
Information,” Science, 290(5500), 2261–2262.
HUCK, S., W. MU¨LLER, AND H.-T. NORMANN (2001): “Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion
and efficiency in experimental markets,” Economic Journal, 111, 749–765.
LINDLEY, D., A. TVERSKY, AND R. BROWN (1979): “On the Reconciliation of Probability Assess-
ments,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (General), 142(2), 146–180.
MANSKI, C. F. (2002): “Identification of Decision Rules in Experiments on Simple Games of Pro-
posal and Response,” European Economic Review, 46, 880–891.
(2004): “Measuring Expectations,” Econometrica, 72(5), 1329–1376.
MCLEISH, K. N., AND R. OXOBY (2004): “Specific Decision and Strategy Vector Methods in Ulti-
matum Bargaining: Evidence on the Strength of Other-Regarding Behavior,” Economics Letters,
84, 399–405.
NYARKO, Y., AND A. SCHOTTER (2002): “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited
Beliefs,” Econometrica, 70(3), 971–1005.
ORTMANN, A., J. FITZGERALD, AND C. BOEING (2000): “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A
Re-Examination,” Experimental Economics, 3, 81–100.
RAPOPORT, A., AND T. WALLSTEN (1972): “Individual Decision Behavior,” Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 23, 131–176.
SELTEN, R. (1967): Die Strategiemethode Zur Erforschung Des Eingeschra¨nkt Rationalen Verhaltens im
Rahmen Eines Oligopolexperimentspp. 136–168. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Thu¨bingen.
35
SONNEMANS, J., AND T. OFFERMAN (2001): “Is the Quadratic Scoring Rule Really Incentive Com-
patible?,” Working paper CREED, University of Amsterdam.
TRAIN, K. E. (2003): Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press.
36
